


CAVEAT: There is not actually a real-valued “preferability” assigned to bets; these graphs are just meant to hint at relative preference.

If a rational agent (satisfying RAT1-4) has the preferences shown here, then U would be assigned probability 0.75.

“preferability”

$$P(U) =_{\text{def}} \sup \{ \alpha \mid (U, \alpha) \geq (\neg U, 1-\alpha) \}$$



A bet:

(U, α)	if U (75%):	win \$99	?	win \$1
	if $\neg U$ (25%):	lose \$1		lose \$99

prefer!

Its complementary bet:

$(\neg U, 1-\alpha)$	if U (75%):	lose \$99	?	lose \$1
	if $\neg U$ (25%):	win \$1		win \$99


prefer!

At $\alpha=0.01$ clearly
 $(U, \alpha) \geq (\neg U, 1-\alpha)$

At $\alpha=0.75$,
no preference

At $\alpha=0.99$ clearly
 $(\neg U, 1-\alpha) \geq (U, \alpha)$

CAVEAT: There is not actually a real-valued “preferability” assigned to bets; these graphs are just meant to hint at relative preference.



How some of the RAT axioms and their mathematical consequences relate to this way of defining probability.